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Living with the Risk of Backfire: A
Response to the Feminist Critiques of
Privacy and Equality
Laura W. Stein*
Feminist' legal scholars have been searching for one all-en-
compassing legal argument with which to challenge the subor-
dination of women. They have sought a single form of analysis
and argument that will persuade judges to end the oppression
of women, that will persuade legislators to empower women,
and that women will view as authentic. Some claim that such
an approach is necessary to focus attention on the fact that
many seemingly disparate practices combine to reinforce the
subordination of women. Others imply that a single, new ap-
proach is necessary to jettison the baggage of past ways of
thinking and to enable the system to approach legal matters
with sensitivity to women's perspectives.
The feminist search for a single approach has often begun
with the two legal doctrines that have done the most to em-
power women over the last several decades: privacy and equal-
ity. Courts have used privacy to guarantee women some degree
of procreative freedom.2 Congress and the courts have primar-
ily utilized equality to free women from oppression in employ-
ment.3 Feminists writing in each area, however, have recently
* Associate Professor, New York Law School. I thank the readers of
earlier drafts for their insights and suggestions: Scott Altman, Kathy Baker,
Karen Gross, Bruce Hay, Linda Keenan, David Schoenbrod, Jeffrey Winkler,
and Jennifer Zacks. For valuable assistance, I thank Joseph Molinari of the
New York Law School Library and my research assistants, Donna Kantrowitz
and Steven Simpson. I would like to give special thanks for helpful insights
and encouragement to Stephen Massey, my colleague and friend, who passed
away this year.
1. I use the word "feminist" to denote all persons engaged in the struggle
against the social oppression of women.
2. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (right of privacy "in-
cludes the abortion decision"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485
(1965) (right of privacy extends to married couples' use of contraceptives).
3. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988) (Title VII's
prohibition of sex discrimination in employment); Meritor Say. Bank v. Vin-
son, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (holding that sexual harassment of women in the
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identified dangers associated with these doctrines. Their criti-
ques of privacy and equality are similar. Feminists criticize
both doctrines for failing to transform power arrangements em-
bodied in the status quo that reinforce the subordination of wo-
men to men.4 According to these scholars, using privacy and
equality doctrines before courts and legislators is a strategy
that can easily backfire by strengthening, rather than challeng-
ing, the status quo. Furthermore, feminists criticize the
doctrines for being non-authentic; they force women to state
claims in a way that may seem alien.5
These shortcomings have motivated feminists to call for
the abandonment of each doctrine for some other approach.
Some feminist scholars, writing about reproductive issues, call
for a shift in analysis in procreative rights cases from privacy to
equality, thus elevating equality as the one best doctrine to
challenge women's oppression.6 At the same time, scholars
workplace can violate Title VII's prohibition of gender-based employment dis-
crimination); City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 717 (1978) (holding illegal under Title VII a pension plan that dis-
criminated against women by requiring women to contribute more than men).
4. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond
Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93, 101-02 (1987) [hereinafter MACKIN-
NON, Privacy v. Equality] (criticizing privacy rhetoric for reinforcing rather
than challenging the "separate spheres" ideology that has traditionally op-
pressed women); Rhonda Copelon, Unpacking Patriarchy Reproduction, Sex-
uality, Originalism and Constitutional Change, in A LESS THAN PERFECT
UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 303, 314
(Jules Lobel ed., 1988) (arguing that while privacy doctrine has made some
gains for women possible, at the same time "it has reinforced the original dis-
tinction between public and private that has been essential to the patriarchal
differentiation of male from female, the family from the state and market, the
superior from the inferior, the measure from the other"); Lucinda M. Finley,
Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Work-
place Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1158 (1986) (criticizing equality doctrine
for being non-transformative because it is based on male norms of experience
and perspective); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male
Ideology, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 48-49 (Jay L.
Garfield & Patricia Hennessey eds., 1984) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Male Ideol-
ogy] (criticizing privacy advocates for reinforcing separate spheres).
5. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron?-A Study
of the Briefs Filed in William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 137, 140 (1990) (discussing the need to alter women's con-
stitutionally-based arguments to allow a "more authentic feminist voice").
For a brief discussion of the feminist concept of authenticity, see Patricia
Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 191, 193-94 & n. 10 (1989-90). Cain discusses the view of some feminists
that women cannot know their authentic selves now because society's patriar-
chal structure clouds their vision. Others, including Cain, believe that at least
some glimpse of women's authentic selves is currently possible. Id
6. See, e.g., MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality, supra note 4, at 102 n.21
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writing about employment discrimination urge women to base
legal claims on appeals to our responsibilities to each other,
rather than on appeals to rights-based claims such as demands
for equality.7
This Article suggests that feminists need not seek out one
doctrine or form of legal analysis to meet all feminist goals.
Although feminists have illuminated real risks current legal
doctrines present, the answer is not to abandon them for some
other, better approach. Instead, to avoid even greater dangers,
feminists must try to transform these doctrines. There is no
reason why feminists must choose between privacy and equality
or between equality and some other way of claiming entitle-
ments. Instead, feminists can and should use the whole range
of legal arguments available.
Part I explores the feminist critique of privacy doctrine, de-
veloped in the context of the abortion issue, and the feminist
critique of equality doctrine, developed in the context of assess-
ing legal responses to oppression in employment. The discus-
sion highlights the parallels between the two critiques. Part II
argues that despite the defects in privacy as currently consti-
tuted, the doctrine is not beyond redemption. Feminists should
work to alter the doctrine's emphasis on the historic separation
between state and home to a new emphasis on autonomy and
personhood. Furthermore, to the extent that anti-privacy femi-
nists extol equality as a cure-all substitute, they ignore that
equality doctrine presents risks for women similar to those
presented by privacy. Turning to the critique of equality, this
Article recognizes that feminist commentators have identified
genuine risks posed by continued appeals to equality. Yet these
feminists have not considered adequately the possibility that
equality too can be transformed to incorporate feminist values.
By advocating responsibility-oriented legal arguments as a sub-
stitute for equality, the critics do not seem to fully appreciate
the risks that accompany this new form of legal argumentation.
Finally, in Part III, this Article addresses the premise that
underlies much of the feminist critiques of both privacy and
(privacy is ill-equipped to focus on women's well-being; equal protection could
be "forcefully argued" instead); Colker, supra note 5, at 187; cf Cass R. Sun-
stein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARV. L. REV. 826, 840 (1988) (review-
ing CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987) and discussing
MacKinnon's advocacy of a move from privacy to equality in abortion cases).
For a general discussion of the feminist critique of privacy, see Linda C. Mc-
Clain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 117 (1992).
7. See Finley, supra note 4, at 1166-67.
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equality: that feminists should have a unified legal approach to
address all social subordination of women. This is not a desira-
ble goal, from a theoretical or a practical standpoint. Instead,
the best way for feminists to proceed is through the selective or
joint application of approaches, while remaining conscious of
and clear about the risks that each approach entails.
I. THE CRITIQUES OF PRIVACY AND EQUALITY
A. THE NARROWING OF THE DOCTRINES
The Supreme Court has used the right to "privacy" implicit
in the constitutional guarantee of due process in part to protect
from state intervention women's power to make procreative
choices.8 At the same time, Congress has enacted various laws
that guarantee women some degree of equality in the work-
place9 and the Court has used the Equal Protection Clause to
the same end. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has in-
terpreted both privacy and equality in an increasingly narrow
manner.
The Court has narrowed the identified purpose behind the
privacy doctrine. In the context of refusing to extend the pri-
vacy right to protect consensual homosexual activity from crim-
8. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (striking down a state
law prohibiting all abortions except when the life of the mother was at stake);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (striking down on privacy and
equal protection grounds a state law prohibiting dissemination of contracep-
tives to unmarried minors); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (striking
down a state anti-miscegenation law); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965) (striking down a state law barring dissemination of contraceptives
to married couples).
9. Several laws guarantee women some degree of equality in employ-
ment. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1988), made it unlawful for
covered employers to pay women less for "equal work on jobs the performance
of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are per-
formed under similar working conditions." Id. at § 206(d)(1). This was
quickly followed by the broader protections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1988), which prohibits covered employers
from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to [her] compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's ... sex." Id- at § 2000e-2(a)(1). By prohibiting discrimination, Title VII
in effect requires that the sexes be treated equally. Additionally, women can
challenge discrimination by public employers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988),
which prohibits state actors from depriving persons of their federally-created
rights. A victim of a public employer's discrimination can sue under § 1983,
alleging that the employer's action deprived her of the federal constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of law. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219,
220-21 (1988); Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d
1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 1991).
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inal prosecution, the Court stated that the purpose of privacy
doctrine is simply to protect decisions that historically have
been regarded as improper objects of state interference. 10
Under this interpretation, privacy is decidedly non-transforma-
tive; indeed, the whole purpose of privacy under this conception
is to perpetuate the status quo.1
The Court has also curtailed privacy doctrine by narrowing
prior holdings, particularly by dismantling piece-by-piece the
limited right to abortion recognized in Roe v. Wade.'2 In Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Services, a plurality of the Court
formalistically upheld a range of state regulations that made
abortions more difficult and costly for women to obtain'13
Next, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,14 the Court cut back on the Roe framework significantly.
Courts will no longer strike down restrictions on pre-viability
abortions unless they are narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
ling government interest;15 instead, even at the earliest stages
of pregnancy, restrictions are valid unless they constitute an
"undue burden" on the right to abortion.16
At the same time, the Supreme Court has signalled a re-
treat from the broad promise of equality doctrine. For exam-
ple, in the last few years the Court has significantly restricted
the ability of plaintiffs to prevail in suits brought under the fed-
eral anti-discrimination laws.17 Although many of these cases
10. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986). Because states have
long made homosexual conduct illegal, the Court found that it was constitu-
tional for them to continue to do so. Id at 192-94.
11. Reading Bowers as advocating a historical view of privacy may attri-
bute more coherence to the opinion than it deserves. Justice White made it
clear in the opinion that the Court was not deciding whether the state could
criminalize heterosexual sodomy without running afoul of the Constitution-
implying that a case involving heterosexuals might lead to a different result.
See i&i at 188 n.2. As the Georgia law at issue in Bowers illustrates, however,
states have long criminalized all types of sodomy without distinguishing be-
tween them. See id at 186 n.1. Thus, under the "historic" interpretation of
the meaning of privacy, it is not clear how the Court can distinguish between
heterosexual and homosexual sodomy.
12. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
13. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
14. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
15. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
16. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819-21. The Casey Court specifically overruled
two earlier abortion cases based on the privacy doctrine: Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) and
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983). Casey, 112
S. Ct. at 2816-17.
17. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991) (hold-
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concerned race discrimination, most were equally applicable to
women bringing claims of sex discrimination in employment.
Perhaps the most important effect of these decisions is that
they make it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in so-called
"disparate impact" cases, in which they allege that a facially-
neutral employment practice disparately affects a protected
group.18 Thus, plaintiffs who could not prove that their em-
ployer intentionally treated them worse because of their gender
found it difficult to prevail. These decisions reflect a retreat
from a vision of the civil rights laws as designed to alleviate
group oppression, the vision often expressed by feminists; in-
stead the Court appears to view the laws as designed to help in-
dividual victims of intentional mistreatment.19  Although
Congress has nullified these decisions to a large extent by en-
acting the Civil Rights Act of 1991,20 the new Act has not fully
reversed the Court's cramped reading of disparate impact doc-
trine.2 1 Furthermore, the Court's recent equal protection juris-
prudence reflects its retreat from using equality as a doctrine to
ing that Title VII does not apply to Americans employed abroad by American
Companies); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-58 (1989)
(making it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove "disparate impact" discrimina-
tion); Lorance v. A.T. & T., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (holding that plaintiffs must
bring challenges to seniority systems under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 within 180 days of the date the system was adopted, rather than 180 days
from the date that plaintiff suffered an adverse effect due to the system).
18. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 645-46.
19. See Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination,
59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 526-27, 531-33 (1991) (arguing that in Wards Cove the
Court endorsed a "fault theory" of discrimination); see also Alan D. Freeman,
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 96, 98-
99, 104 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (identifying traditional disparate impact analy-
sis as representing the victim's perspective, whereas disparate treatment anal-
ysis represents the perspective of the perpetrator of discrimination). But see
Mack A. Player, Is Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) on Wards Cove Pack-
ing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) (arguing that Wards Cove
might not have fundamentally changed disparate impact law).
20. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1988,
2000e, 2000e-1 to -2, -4 to -5 & 16 (Supp. 1992)).
21. In particular, the statute largely codified the requirement first an-
nounced in Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-58, that there is ordinarily a burden on
the plaintiffs to show which of the employer's specific practices has led to the
adverse impact. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. 1992). This may be a
difficult burden for plaintiffs to meet, particularly if their employer has a com-
plex decision-making process or has not kept good records of the results of
each step in the process. The statute relieves plaintiffs of this burden only if
they "can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent's deci-
sionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis." Id. Although
no court has yet interpreted this section, it would seem an extraordinary case
1158 [Vol. 77:1153
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challenge group-based harms.2 2
in which the elements of a decision-making process cannot be separated out at
all.
Furthermore, under the Act's codification of disparate impact doctrine,
even if a plaintiff does prove that a particular practice has a disparately nega-
tive impact on a protected group, the employer will still prevail if it can prove
the practice is "consistent with business necessity." Id. at § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(i). The Court created this "business necessity" defense in 1971, at
the same time it created disparate impact theory. See Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Initially the Court interpreted the business ne-
cessity exception very narrowly. In Wards Cove, however, the Court sug-
gested that the defense was not overly difficult for defendants to establish.
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659 (holding that, in order to establish the business
necessity defense, the employer need not show that the practice in question is
"'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business").
Rather than squarely settling this conflict, the 1991 Act leaves the term
"business necessity" undefined. The Act's "Purposes" section does state that
Congress intended to codify the concept of business necessity as courts under-
stood it prior to Wards Cove. See Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 3(2), 105 Stat. 1071,
1071 (1991). Furthermore, the Act provides that only one specific interpretive
memorandum "shall be considered legislative history of... any provision of
this Act that relates to Wards Cove-Business necessity," id. at § 105(b); that
memorandum mirrors the language of the "Purposes" section of the Act. See
137 CONG. REC. S15,276 (1991). Members of Congress and the President, how-
ever, nonetheless added legislative history concerning the business necessity
defense. Legislative history that liberals in Congress contributed seems to
agree with the interpretive memorandum. See id. at S15,233-34 (statement of
Senator Kennedy that "[o]ne of the Civil Rights Act's fundamental purposes
was to overrule Wards Cove and restore the law to its status under Griggs ver-
sus Duke Power"). Legislative history Republican Senator Dole added, how-
ever, states that Congress intended the Act to codify judicial understanding of
business necessity expressed in all prior cases, including Wards Cove. See id.
at S15,475-76 (statements of Senator Dole that "the bill is no longer designed
to overrule the meaning of business necessity in Wards Cove," and "the pres-
ent bill has codified the 'business necessity' test . . . reiterated in Wards
Cove"). Because a conservative Court might find enough ambiguity in the Act
and its legislative history to continue interpreting the business necessity de-
fense broadly, plaintiffs in disparate impact suits may find victory difficult.
In other ways, however, the statute clearly overruled some conservative
Supreme Court decisions. For example, the Act specifically reverses Lorance,
which required individuals whom a seniority system disadvantages to chal-
lenge that system within 180 days of its adoption; instead, the Act provides
them 180 days from the date the system was adopted, when they became sub-
ject to it, or when it adversely affected them. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2)
(Supp. 1992). Similarly, Congress clearly decided that Title VII applies to
Americans who work for American companies abroad. See id § 2000e-1 (legis-
latively overruling EEOC v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991)).
22. See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In
Croson, the Court applied the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate a program
that gave minority-controlled businesses an advantage in obtaining municipal
construction contracts. Id. at 511. A plurality held that municipalities cannot




Feminist critiques of privacy and equality coincide with
this judicial retreat and may in part be motivated by it. The
critiques do more, however, than express concern that courts
may no longer construe the privacy right as encompassing a
right to abortion or that equality guarantees may no longer ef-
fectively prohibit discriminatory practices that disparately im-
pact women. The belief at the heart of both critiques is that,
even beyond the danger of losing ground before a conservative
Court, privacy (for some critics) and equality (for others) are
not suitable or desirable conduits for feminist arguments.
Feminist scholars criticize privacy and equality doctrines
on three grounds. First, both the privacy and equality critics
claim that the approach they are criticizing entrenches the
"separate spheres ideology," which has disadvantaged women
throughout American history. Second, the privacy critics argue
that placing abortion (or, presumably, any issue of importance
to women) in the privacy framework allows jurists and others
to consider it falsely as a sex-neutral issue, rather than claiming
it as an issue that is profoundly related to the oppression of wo-
men. The equality critics make the opposite argument that,
under an equality approach, issues of importance to women are
often devalued as "women's issues." Third, some members of
both groups of critics argue that the approach they criticize fos-
ters values of autonomy and independence of self that have
been important to men, while ignoring values that have been
important to women, such as interconnection and relationships.
1. Reinforcing the Separate Spheres
For many years, feminists have criticized the legally en-
against particular racial groups by enacting race-conscious forms of relief that
benefit the group in general. Id- at 504.
It seems likely that the current Court would be hostile to preferences for
women, making it similarly difficult for feminists acting on a state political
level to eradicate societal discrimination against women. It is true that, as a
matter of doctrine, states and municipalities should have more latitude to en-
act gender preferences than racial preferences, since courts subject gender
classifications to intermediate scrutiny while racial classifications recieve strict
scrutiny. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-
94. Nevertheless, the Court could easily extend Croson and refuse to recog-
nize a constitutional difference between invidious discrimination and efforts to
remedy discrimination in the gender context. If -the Court views gender-con-
scious remedies designed to .protect women from societal discrimination as
equivalent to gender oppression, then it would be unlikely to sustain such
remedies even under intermediate scrutiny.
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trenched ideology of the separate spheres as harmful to wo-
men.23 This ideology maintains that the world consists of two
distinct and separable parts: public and private. The public
sphere is the world of government and commerce, in which the
power of the state is routinely involved. The private sphere is
the realm of home and family, which, according to the ideology,
should be free from state intervention.
The separate spheres ideology has been used to oppress wo-
men in several related ways. Historically, the ideal of separa-
tion served as a justification for excluding women from the
public sphere-the locus of monetary and governmental
power-on the ground that these public pursuits do not befit
the gentler sex.24 Although most explicit exclusions of women
from the public sphere have become illegal over the last quar-
ter-century,25 the ideology has continued to make it difficult for
women to enter or remain in the working world because it le-
gitimizes discrimination by employers against female employees
who have "private" responsibilities such as giving birth or rais-
ing children.26
Furthermore, this exclusion from the public sphere has
subordinated women in the private sphere.27 Women come
23. For brief discussions of the development of the separate spheres ideol-
ogy, see DEBORAH RHODE, JusTICE AND GENDER 9-11, 14-16, 19-28, 125-31
(1989); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
955, 958-59 (1984); Diane Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in
THE POLrrIcs OF LAW, supra note 19, at 294, 297-99; Nadine Taub & Elizabeth
M. Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of Law,
in THE POLITCS OF LAW, supra note 19, at 104, 118-24.
24. See Copelon, supra note 4, at 310-13.
25. But see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upholding under
the exception to Title VII women's exclusion from jobs as prison guards in
male prisons in Alabama on the ground that prisoners might rape women in
these positions and undermine order). Up until the Supreme Court's recent
decision in UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991), it also appeared
that businesses might exclude women (or, at least, women unable to demon-
strate infertility) from thousands of jobs involving exposure to materials that
are potentially harmful to fetuses. Lower courts had approved such exclu-
sions. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(upholding the legality of a fetal protection plan on the ground that it consti-
tuted a bona fide occupational qualification), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991);
Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1190-91 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that fetal
protection programs are lawful if an employer can establish "business neces-
sity"). The Supreme Court, however, found that Title VII prohibited fetal pro-
tection plans. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1209-1210.
26. See Finley, supra note 4, at 1120.
27. See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 827 (explaining the feminist argument




under the power of men in the private sphere because exclu-
sion from the public realm leads to dependence on men for
most social goods, such as money, legal rights, and prestige.
Perversely, after relegating women to a subordinate status in a
lower-status sphere, the separate spheres ideology causes soci-
ety to ignore even gross instances of oppression of women
within the private sphere.28
The feminist critics of privacy argue that privacy doctrine
reinforces the ideology of the separate spheres.29 They contend
that the underlying assumption of privacy doctrine as currently
constituted is that non-interference by the government in the
private sphere will guarantee autonomy to private citizens. 30
This theory, however, does not work for women. Privacy doc-
trine carves out a sphere relating to marriage, family, and het-
erosexual activity that is free from government interference.
Yet at the same time, it entrenches the existing male-domi-
nated power structure within the private sphere as prima facie
just simply because the power structure is not the direct result
of governmental coercion.3S According to its critics, privacy
28. For example, because government is not supposed to interfere in "pri-
vate" matters, the law in several states permits husbands to rape their wives.
See RHODE, sup'ra note 23, at 249-51 (discussing changing legal attitudes toward
marital rape). Furthermore, in many communities, police have been unwilling
to respond to physical abuse of women by their husbands or boyfriends. Id. at
237-44.
For a critical response to the feminist argument against the public/private
distinction, see generally Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Dis-
tinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992).
29. See, e.g., MAcKINNON, Privacy v. Equality, supra note 4, at 96-97;
MacKinnon, Male Ideology, supra note 4, at 48-49; Frances Olsen, Unraveling
Compromise, 103 HARv. L. REv. 105, 111-13 (1989); Polan, supra note 23, at
299.
30. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality, supra note 4, at 96; MacKinnon,
Male Ideology, supra note 4, at 51; Olsen, supra note 29, at 112.
31. See MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality, supra note 4, at 99-100. Accord-
ing to Catharine MacKinnon, privacy doctrine views injury as arising when
government violates the private sphere. The doctrine is blind to injury
"within by and because of" the private sphere. Id. at 100. See also Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281,
1311 (1991) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Reflections] (explaining that privacy will
not protect women because it necessarily "belongs to the individual with
power. Women have been accorded neither individuality nor power.").
Similarly, Frances Olsen explains:
Much of privacy doctrine is based on the assumption that "so long as
the public does not interfere [with private life], autonomous individu-
als interact freely and equally." Yet, in so many aspects of life, cer-
tainly including sexuality, most women are not actually autonomous
individuals able to interact freely and equally with men. To change
this situation "will require intervention, not abdication."
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doctrine thereby legitimizes the private oppression of women.
The inevitable result is that rights based on privacy will be ex-
tremely limited. Thus, for example, the privacy-based right to
abortion does not empower women to control their own sexual
destinies; women are still coerced into sexual relationships.3 2
Similarly, the feminist critics of equality argue that equal-
ity doctrine perpetuates the ideology of the separate spheres.
Equality critics object to two versions of equality that have
been used by advocates and scholars seeking to empower wo-
men in the workplace: the equal treatment and special treat-
ment approaches.33  The proponents of equal treatment
demand that women and men be treated with strict formal
equality, contending history demonstrates that any departure
from such an approach will be used as an excuse to disadvan-
tage women.34 Equality critics respond by noting that formal
equality does not challenge the separation of the spheres. In-
stead, it merely allows women who are like men to adopt the
Olsen, supra note 29, at 112 (quoting MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality, supra
note 4, at 99, 100).
32. See MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality, supra note 4, at 95-96, 99. In-
deed, MacKinnon contends that the abortion right primarily serves to make
women more sexually available to men by depriving women of the one male-
accepted reason for saying no to sex-fear of pregnancy. Id Of course,
MacKinnon does not advocate the wholesale abandonment of the right to
abortion because of this effect. As she explains, "Roe v. Wade presumes that
government nonintervention into the private sphere promotes a woman's free-
dom of choice. When the alternative is jail, there is much to be said for this
argument." Id at 100.
MacKinnon's assertion that the primary effect of the privacy-based abor-
tion right is to liberate sexual aggression is questionable. Many women desire
heterosexual sex without the risk of forced motherhood; it is presumptuous to
think all such women are victims of false consciousness. See Kathryn Abrams,
Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761, 768-70 (1990). For these
women, the right to abortion, even if they never exercise it, allows them to
enjoy their sexuality in ways that otherwise might have been impossible.
Although for some women the right to abortion deprives them of their last ex-
cuse to abstain from sex, thus exploiting them further, other women experi-
ence the right to abortion (even a right rooted in privacy) as liberating. See
also Copelon, supra note 4, at 331 n.37 (disputing MacKinnon's argument that
"heterosexual relations in a gender oppressive society are by definition oppres-
sive" as a "flat and dangerous stereotype").
33. For a discussion of the opposition between the equal treatment and
special treatment camps, see Finley, supra note 4, at 1143-48; Christine A. Lit-
tleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1291-1301 (1987);
Diana Majury, Strategizing In Equality, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF THE LAW
320, 320-23 (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen eds., 1990).
34. A leading example of this school of thought is Wendy Williams, Equal-
ity's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate,
13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985).
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male institutional role.3 5
The special treatment proponents argue that to attain ac-
tual equality in employment opportunities, the law must take
into account some real differences between men and women,
most notably biological differences. 36 To have substantive
equality between the sexes, they argue, the law must accommo-
date women's particular reproductive role.37 Critics of the spe-
cial treatment approach contend, however, that "the special
35. As Lucinda Finley explains, the equal treatment school
tells us specifically to treat women the same as men, so that women
can have the same opportunities men have had to compete in the
male-valued work world, and so that women can escape the female
populated, and male-devalued, home world. Thus, it implicitly ac-
cepts the male norms of "competition" and "success." "To demand
only the chance to compete is to embrace the status quo in a way that
tends to sanction oppressive arrangements-for example, the neces-
sity of choosing between children and career." In this way a focus on
equal treatment accepts the idea that work and family are dichoto-
mous spheres, and asks primarily that women be allowed out of one
world and into another.
Finley, supra note 4, at 1155-56 (emphasis added) (quoting Ann C. Scales, To-
wards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L. J. 375, 427 (1981)); see also Lit-
tleton, supra note 33, at 1292.
36. See, e.g., ELIZABETH H. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WO-
MEN 156-58 (1980); see also Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence,
56 IND. L.J. 375, 430-34 (1981) (discussing a view of equality under which wo-
men are granted both equal and special rights); Iris M. Young, Polity and
Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, in FEMI-
NISM AND POLrICAL THEORY 117, 136-37 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 1990) (advocat-
ing a special treatment approach to the issue of maternity leave).
37. The implications of this debate are most clearly illustrated in the con-
troversy over state laws requiring employers to provide leave for maternity-
related disability, but not for other temporary disabilities. See California Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (upholding, over a Title VII
preemption challenge, a California law requiring employers to provide preg-
nant women with unpaid "reasonable maternity leave" for up to four months).
Proponents of equal treatment have argued unsuccessfully that such state laws
are inconsistent with Title VII's declaration that "women affected by preg-
nancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions shall be treated the same...
as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988). See, e.g., Brief for the National Organiza-
tion for Women, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Califor-
nia Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (arguing that
California's law guaranteeing a period of unpaid maternity leave should only
survive preemption if it is read to grant leave for all temporary disabilities).
They are concerned that guarantees of "special" benefits will ultimately stig-
matize women. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 34, at 367. In contrast, special
treatment advocates favor such "pregnancy preferences," reasoning they are
necessary to protect women from the significant risk of being forced out of the
workplace by pregnancy. See, e.g., Linda J. Kreiger & Patricia N. Cooney, The
Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning
of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 513, 519-21 (1983); The
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treatment approach may help perpetuate the separate spheres
ideology, both because it can be interpreted as accepting that
women, as childbearers, are and will always be the primary
childrearers, and because it leaves unchallenged workplace val-
ues in areas besides childbearing that stem from the separate
spheres."38
According to equality theory critics, neither form of equal-
ity doctrine will liberate women from oppression by men
within the private sphere. At best, the doctrine may allow
some women to operate in the public, rather than the private,
sphere.3 9 Neither version of equality challenges the values of
the public sphere. Rather than achieving power for women
generally, the minority of women who do operate in the public
sphere will, in order to succeed, necessarily be co-opted into the
preexisting male-defined value system.
The equality doctrine arguably makes the institution of
separate spheres appear not only inevitable but also just. The
promise of equality recently embedded in our law has allowed
some women to succeed in the public sphere. This feeds into
the mythology that women who do not succeed in the public
sphere choose to stay in the private sphere and are thus happy
with the existing power arrangement. According to this rea-
soning, if some women succeed and achieve power in the world
as currently structured, then the fault for the disempowerment
of the others lies in themselves, not in the system.40 If a
group's disempowerment is a result of its own freely made
Supreme Court 1986 Term-Leading Cases 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 326-27
(1987) (discussing California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n).
38. Finley, supra note 4, at 1157 (footnote omitted).
39. It is true that over the last couple of decades increasing numbers of
women (even married women with children) have entered and remained in
the workforce. To that extent, one might argue that a large number of women
do operate in the public sphere or, perhaps, in both spheres. But women's
presence in the public sphere remains marginalized because women remain in
low paying service professions where they have little real power. See RHODE,
supra note 23, at 163. Furthermore, women who attempt to live in both
worlds often find the experience difficult and damaging rather than empower-
ing. "The separation [of the spheres] has rendered working women's lives into
a stressful, exhausting juggling act that leaves them little time or energy for
feeling fulfilled and expanded by their dual roles and their relationships
within each role." Finley, supra note 4, at 1165.
40. This is an argument against comparable worth that students in my
employment discrimination class have voiced. Their theory is that society has
no obligation to ensure that a fair amount of money is paid for traditionally
female work; after all, if women want more money, Title VII has opened the
door for them to go out and find higher-paying, traditionally male work.
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choices, how can it be unjust?41
2. Identifying Gender Issues
Privacy critics also fault the doctrine for its failure to iden-
tify abortion as an issue about women's subordination.42 They
argue that privacy doctrine will never transform the world into
a less oppressive place because it turns women's attention away
from issues of sexual oppression.43 Privacy doctrine views
abortion as an abstract question about the role of the state.
This vision wholly ignores the sexual oppression that leads to
unwanted pregnancy, oppression that takes many forms from
rape to the social conditioning that makes women unable to say
no, or, worse, unable even to want to say no.44 By ignoring wo-
men's oppression, privacy doctrine makes it more difficult for
feminists successfully to attack that oppression.45
41. For an explanation of the flaws with this reasoning, see RHODE, supra
note 23, at 164-67. Rhode points out that this mythology of "choice" ignores
social constraints on women's employability, such as "cultural expectations"
and "cultural stereotypes" that may cause many women to invest less in devel-
oping their human capital. Id at 165-67. In addition, it ignores the fact that
many women bear a disproportionate burden with regard to family responsi-
bilities. Id at 167; see also Freeman, supra note 19, at 98 (criticizing the argu-
ment that people choose disempowerment as applied in the context of race
discrimination).
42. See, e.g., MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality, supra note 4, at 98-102; Ol-
sen, supra note 29, at 111-13.
43. See MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality, supra note 4, at 93 (criticizing
privacy doctrine for its failure to "situate abortion and the abortion right in
the experience of women").
44. See id at 94-96.
45. MacKinnon also argues that when the Supreme Court embraced abor-
tion as a private privilege as opposed to a public right, it eliminated the argu-
ment that the government has an obligation to fund abortions. Idc at 100-01.
Under Roe, "women are guaranteed by the public no more than what we can
get in private-that is, what we can extract through our intimate associations
with men." Id at 100. Privacy theory does not mandate state aid for abortion
because the state need not give women any options beyond what they have in
private-and poor women have no private option to have an abortion. See i&.
at 101. MacKinnon, however, never explores the possibility of transforming
the right to privacy in a more positive way that would require public abortion
funding. See infra text accompanying notes 87-88 (discussing Dorothy Rob-
erts's proposal for transforming privacy); see also McClain, supra note 6, at
135-37 (discussing privacy-based arguments for the funding of abortion).
Furthermore, MacKinnon uses this funding argument to advocate aban-
doning privacy doctrine in favor of an abortion right rooted in equality theory.
See MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality, supra note 4, at 100-02. But it is far
from clear that the Court would hold, even on equal protection grounds, that
the government has an obligation to fund abortions. The Court might eventu-
ally accept the argument that by prohibiting abortions states deny women
equality by denying them the choice that men have to control their reproduc-
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In a similar vein, equality critics contend that equality in
its equal treatment form does not do enough to help women.
They argue that the equal treatment principle accepts men as
the norm, and gives women rights only to the extent that wo-
men are like men.46 As a consequence, although the principle
of formal equality helped eradicate some of the most gross and
senseless oppression of women (for example, irrational exclu-
sions from traditionally male jobs), it has not and cannot help
in instances in which there are "real" differences between men
and women, whether biologically or socially constructed.47 In-
stead, the equal treatment approach forces women to deny
those differences.
Yet equality critics also condemn the special treatment
form of the doctrine. They argue that it causes issues of impor-
tance to women to be labeled as "women's issues," thus ensur-
ing the legal system will undervalue these concerns.48 The
entitlements special treatment adherents claim in the name of
ultimate equality are special only because men do not desire
them for themselves. 49 Viewed in this light, the term "special"
inevitably becomes pejorative "because of the history of glorify-
ing that which is male and devaluing the experiences and quali-
ties of women." 50  Because "special" entitlements are, by
definition, non-male, and thus, in our social context, non-legiti-
mate, it will always be an uphill battle for women to get them.
Moreover, once obtained, these entitlements will always stig-
matize women by reinforcing detrimental stereotypes. 51
Thus, while the privacy critics criticize privacy for its fail-
ure to label abortion as a women's issue, the equality critics
condemn special treatment equality precisely because it identi-
tion. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2846 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("A
State's restrictions on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy also impli-
cate constitutional guarantees of gender equality."). However, even if the
Court accepts the equality rationale, the government could still deny abortion
funding on the theory that a woman's poverty, not any state action, stands in
the way of her exercise of equal legal rights. See Gavison, supra note 28, at 32-
33.
46. See, e.g., Law, supra note 23, at 967-68; Scales, supra note 36, at 427-28.
47. See Law, supra note 23, at 988-1002 (documenting the equal treatment
approach's failure to deal adequately with cases involving classifications based
on "real" differences).
48. Finley, supra note 4, at 1158.
49. See id. at 1156; Majury, supra note 33, at 322-23.
50. Finley, supra note 4, at 156-57; see also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL
THE DIFFERENCE 58 (1990).
51. See Finley, supra note 4, at 1157.
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fies pregnancy as a women's issue. Ultimately, these two criti-
ques represent the double bind of disempowerment. On one
hand, if we fail to name our needs as women's needs we allow
the powers-that-be to ignore the fact that women are
subordinated. On the other hand, if we do identify our needs as
women's needs, we risk either having them denied or being
stigmatized by the request, because women, and thus women's
needs, are devalued by the system.5 2
3. Ignoring Women's Values
Finally, a group of feminists sometimes referred to as "dif-
ferent voice" feminists53 or "cultural feminists"-5 criticize pri-
vacy because it embraces the traditionally male view of humans
as independent, autonomous right holders, while ignoring the
traditionally female view of humans as interconnected and
flourishing through relationships. 55 For example, in reacting to
privacy-based arguments for a right to abortion, the critics ar-
gue that "the pro-choice perspective assumes 'that we are all, in
some sense, atomized individuals with competing rights, rather
than beings whose very existence is rooted in profound inter-
connections with each other.' "56 The critics contend that pri-
vacy-based arguments for abortion rights ignore or trivialize
52. See MINOW, supra note 50, at 20-23; Mary E. Becker, Politics, Differ-
ences, and Economic Rights, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 169, 169.
53. This appellation refers to Carol Gilligan's book, In a Different Voice,
in which she argued that women and girls often resolve moral dilemmas in a
different way from men and boys. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE
(1982). Specifically, she argues that whereas men's moral reasoning often re-
fers to abstract rights (termed an "ethic of justice"), women often couch their
analysis in terms of their responsibilities to others and to themselves (termed
an "ethic of care"). Id. at 35-38. For a series of feminist assessments of Gilli-
gan's work, see generally the essays contained in FEMINISM & POLITICAL THE-
ORY, supra note 36, at 15-113.
54. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L.
REV. 803, 835-38 (1990); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 13-15 (1988).
55. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 5, at 158 ("Feminists need to replace the
phrase 'pro-choice' with a phrase that is more centrally 'pro-women.' "); see
also Robin West, The Supreme Cour 1989 Term-Forewor&d Taking Freedom
Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REv. 43, 81-83 (1990).
For a general critique of cultural feminism, see Linda Alcoff, Cultural
Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory,
in FEMINIST THEORY IN PRACTICE AND PROCESS 295, 298-304 (Micheline R.
Malson et al. eds., 1986). For a critical analysis of the cultural feminist ap-
proach to law, see generally Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 797 (1989).
56. Colker, supra note 5, at 165 (quoting KATHLEEN MCDONNELL, NOT AN
EASY CHOICE: A FEMINIST RE-EXAMINES ABORTION 53 (1984)).
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the connection between the pregnant woman and the fetus,
thus overlooking the moral value of human connection and the
importance of interpersonal responsibilities.57
Similarly, some feminists criticize equality for emphasizing
male values like autonomy over female values like interconnec-
tion. They argue that claims for equal rights, like all rights
claims, are premised on the liberal conception of the self as es-
sentially separated from others.58 Hence, under traditional for-
mulations, the equal treatment mode of equality at best gives
some autonomous right holders the entitlement to the same
rights as other autonomous right holders. In the special treat-
ment mode, equality simply gives particular autonomous right
holders some extra rights. Thus, because of their basis in tradi-
tional liberalism, equality claims do not easily accommodate
values like "interconnectedness and care. '59 Once again draw-
ing on cultural feminist thought, the equality critics link the
treasured value of autonomy with men and the ignored value of
interconnection with women.60
C. THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
1. The Privacy Critics
In light of their critique, several of the privacy critics argue
feminists should try to assert that procreative rights derive
from the constitutional guarantee of equal protection rather
than privacy.61 These privacy critics urge that by comparing
men's and women's status, equality doctrine will focus atten-
57. See id. at 165-68, 179. As an example of the devaluation of interper-
sonal responsibility, Colker points to amicus curiae briefs filed on behalf of the
National Organization for Women and on behalf of Catholics for a Free Choice
in Webster v. Reproductive Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). These briefs analo-
gized abortion prohibitions to compelled organ donation and reasoned that, be-
cause the right of privacy would clearly prohibit forced organ donation, it must
also prohibit forced pregnancy. Colker faults this analysis for "denying the
importance of values of donation" and asserts that it "refuses to acknowledge
that we may want to live in a world in which we have interconnected responsi-
bilities to each other." Colker, supra note 5, at 179, 180.
58. Finley, supra note 4, at 1159.
59. Id. at 1161.
60. Id.
61. See Colker, supra note 5, at 142, 174-75 (arguing that by couching ar-
guments for abortion rights in privacy terms, feminists "risked losing our own
understanding of the radical equality-based rights we should be seeking in the
abortion area") (emphasis added); MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality, supra
note 4, at 102 n.21 ("The discussion in this speech is a beginning attempt to




tion on the social oppression that has led to a world in which
"[w]omen often do not control the conditions under which they
become pregnant.162 They claim such an inquiry would chal-
lenge women's subordination rather than reinforce the ideology
of the separate spheres.63 Furthermore, they argue that a sex
inequality approach to abortion will identify reproductive issues
as gender issues.64 Finally, they contend that an equality ap-
proach will encourage judges to listen to women's experience
regarding abortion as they compare unwanted pregnancy to ex-
periences that affect men's liberty.65 Thus, judges would de-
velop an appreciation of women's situations and women's
values.
2. The Equality Critics
In light of the flaws and dangers identified in both strands
of equality theory, one of the principal equality critics, Lucinda
Finley, proposes two ways to "enlarge our legal discourse."66
First, lawyers and judges must stop treating differences as
problematic and stop focusing on assimilation as the ideal. In-
stead, they should view differences as relational and not as nec-
essarily justifying negative treatment.6 7 To do this, lawyers and
judges must switch from talking about "differences," with all
the negative connotations of that term, and instead talk about
"varieties" or "nuances.' '6s Furthermore, to ensure that people
are not stigmatized because they vary from the dominant
group, lawmakers will have to listen to the perspectives of the
disempowered. 69 Second, Finley urges that lawyers and judges
supplement claims for "rights" with a language of "responsibili-
ties."70 By asking the law to acknowledge the ways in which
people are responsible to each other, the law will recognize im-
portant values such as community and interconnection.71
62. MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 31, at 1312.
63. See Olsen, supra note 29, at 120.
64. See MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 31, at 1311.
65. See Colker, supra note 5, at 174-75.
66. Finley, supra note 4, at 1166.
67. 1d. at 1166; MINoW, supra note 50, at 52-53.
68. Finley, supra note 4, at 1170.
69. See id
70. Id. at 1166-67.
71. Id. at 1171. Robin West, a critic of liberal privacy doctrine, similarly
advocates couching women's arguments against abortion restrictions in a lan-
guage of responsibilities rather than rights. West, supra note 55, at 82-85. But
cf John Hardwig, Should Women Think in Terms of Rights?, in FEMINISM
AND POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 36, at 53, 58 (arguing that women should
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II. CRITIQUING THE CRITIQUES
The feminist critics make a convincing argument that the
legal concepts of privacy and equality as currently constituted
are neither liberating nor authentic to women. Their argu-
ments, however, are vulnerable to criticism on two grounds.
The critics accept the current versions of privacy and equality
as given, without assessing whether there is a way to transform,
and thus redeem, these doctrines. In fact, feminists can shift
these approaches in directions that would address much of the
critiques.72 Second, the proposals for change do not solve the
problems the critics identify. The privacy critics' advocacy of
equality as a cure-all is not convincing because equality doc-
trine as currently constituted suffers from many of the same
defects as privacy. The equality critics' suggestion that we
abandon traditional doctrines in favor of appeals to responsibil-
ity and interconnection is far riskier than attempting to trans-
form equality doctrine.
A. PROBLEMS wrTH THE CRITIQUE OF PRIVACY
1. The Possibility of Redeeming Privacy
It is not clear whether the feminist critique of privacy
solely concerns privacy as a constitutional doctrine or whether
it is directed more broadly at the entire legal, or even philo-
sophical, concept of privacy. In any case, the critique accepts
current definitions of privacy as given and does not explore
whether there are ways of changing privacy to accommodate
women's experiences and women's arguments.73
not think in terms of rights in the context of intimate relationships because
"[t]hinking in terms of rights rests on a picture... of the person as atomistic,
primarily egoistic, and asocial-only accidentally and externally related to
others.").
72. This is not to suggest that changing doctrines is a simple task. Legal
method, with its reliance on precedent, tends to reinforce the status quo. See
generally Mary J. Mossman, Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference it
Makes, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF THE LAW, supra note 33, at 283. Yet the
difficulty of the task is no reason for abandoning it when it holds real promise
for feminists.
73. This is particularly surprising in MacKinnon's case because she has
never accepted the concept of equality as a given. See CATHARINE A. MACKIN-
NON, Difference and Dominance, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 4, at
32, 41 [hereinafter MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance] (advocating an
approach to equality that asks whether any group is dominated rather than
whether one group is different from another). MacKinnon has eloquently
criticized early feminist legal theory and practice precisely because it accepted
doctrine as given. As she explains:
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Feminists criticize privacy doctrine for entrenching the ide-
ology of the separate spheres, for failing to recognize the gen-
der dimensions of the issues that it touches, and for ignoring
women's values. This indictment is clearly true of the current
constitutional doctrine of privacy. In Bowers v. Hardwick 74 the
Court appeared to define constitutional privacy as solely con-
cerned with keeping the state out of the sphere from which it
has been traditionally excluded.75 This view of privacy by defi-
nition entrenches the ideology of the separate spheres. Fur-
thermore, it does nothing to heighten awareness of gender
implications or to admit female values into legal discourse. As
Judge Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Bowers indicates, how-
ever, this is not the only way to interpret a constitutionally
based privacy right. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Black-
mun demonstrated a very different understanding of the consti-
tutional right to privacy. He specifically rejected Justice
White's historically oriented theory.76 Instead, Justice Black-
mun viewed the privacy right as the right of individuals to au-
tonomy over "the most intimate aspects of their lives. ' 77 Such
an approach may hold some promise for women.78
The initial transmutation of the feminist impulse into law lost a lot in
translation, creating an approach that has not changed much to the
present. Remaining largely within traditional legalism, early practice
and scholarship tended to accept reigning legal assumptions and
method: laws developed when women were not allowed to learn to
read and write, far less vote, enunciated by a state built on the silence
of women, predicated on a society in which women were chattel, liter-
ally or virtually. In these early legal forays, existing doctrine was
largely accepted as given-with the not minor exception that it be ap-
plied to women. Creativity meant shoehorning reality into doctrine.
MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 31, at 1285-86.
74. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
75. See supra notes 10 and 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Bowers Court's conception of privacy.
76. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Like Justice
Holmes, I believe that '[ilt is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.' ") (quoting Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)).
77. See id. at 199-200, 203-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thus, Blackmun
criticized the anti-sodomy statute at issue on the ground that it "denies indi-
viduals the right to decide for themselves whether to engage in particular
forms of private, consensual sexual activity." Id- at 199.
78. In addition to linking privacy to autonomy, however, Blackmun also
delineated a notion of privacy that protects activities occurring within one's
home from state interference. See id- at 206-08. This conception of privacy
clearly reinforces the ideology of the separate spheres.
A recent decision by the Texas Court of Appeals further illustrates that
courts need not interpret the right to privacy in the Bowers majority's
cramped manner. That court struck down a Texas statute that prohibited
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The critiques of the Court's current interpretation of pri-
vacy do not constitute an indictment of privacy as a general
concept. Privacy need not be rooted in history to have mean-
ing. The concept of privacy can be understood as designed to
advance certain values that can have content independent of
historical attitudes.7 9 Some of these values can resonate with
women. Perhaps the most common value identified with pri-
vacy is that described by Justice Blackmun in Bowers-auton-
omy over important personal decisions. Indeed, a majority of
the Court previously linked privacy with autonomy.8 0 Numer-
ous commentators have refined this "autonomy" approach, ar-
guing that decisional privacy doctrine should be seen as
protecting "personhood." Constitutional privacy doctrine does
not protect autonomy absolutely; it does not protect a person's
right to make any choice that he or she wants. As a limiting
principle, personhood theorists suggest that privacy protects us
from government interference with things that "are so impor-
tant to our identity as persons-as human beings-that they
must remain inviolable, at least as against the state.""' Indeed,
the majority opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey endorses to a degree this personhood
conception of privacy.8 2
same-sex intercourse, finding that the statute violated the right to privacy im-
plicit in the Texas state constitution. See State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201
(Tex. Ct. App. 1992). The Supreme Court of Texas has granted a petition to
review Morales. 35 TEx. Sup. CT. J. 117 (1992).
79. For example, Ruth Gavison describes the values privacy protects as in-
cluding "a healthy, liberal, democratic, and pluralistic society; individual au-
tonomy; mental health; creativity; and the capacity to form and maintain
meaningful relations with others." Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of
Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 442 (1980). Gavison's notion of privacy, however, does
not include protection of abortion rights. See id at 436.
80. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right to
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.").
81. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 753
(1989); see also icd at 752-54 (discussing the personhood approach to privacy).
82. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992). As the joint opinion of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter explains, "[a]t the heart of liberty is the right
to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State."
Id (emphasis added). This section of the joint opinion was joined by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens. Id. at 2802.
Unfortunately, the authors of the joint opinion ignored the greater impli-
cation of "personhood" privacy theory. Although they recognized that the
ability to make the choice whether to end a pregnancy is related to per-
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Yet the concept of privacy as autonomy troubles some fem-
inists almost as much as Justice White's historical approach to
privacy. According to cultural feminists, because autonomy is
valued more by men than by women, the result of emphasizing
autonomy is that the law excludes the female value of interper-
sonal responsibility.8 3 Although there is a risk that stressing
autonomy or personhood as a value, to the exclusion of other
values, can reinforce an atomistic conception of society, auton-
omy still has value for women. Some degree of autonomy, for
example, must be presupposed for people to enter into fulfilling
relationships.8 4 The desirable interconnectedness of persons
that cultural feminists identify as a core female value also re-
quires a guarantee of autonomy. Furthermore, recognizing the
personhood of citizens can be especially important to women of
color, whose personhood was long denied by the legal system.8 5
sonhood, they nonetheless upheld certain restrictions on abortions-such as
waiting periods and onerous reporting requirements-which, as a practical
matter, foreclose many poor and young women from obtaining abortions.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57 (discussing the cultural femi-
nist critique of privacy).
84. See, e.g., Susan G. Kupfer, Autonomy and Community in Feminist
Legal Thought, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 583, 585-86, 592-99 (1992); see also
Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1246-51 (1992) (arguing that
in many ways the defense of abortion rights rooted in an appeal to autonomy
is similar to the defense rooted in an appeal to responsibilities); Jennifer
Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1
YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989) (arguing for a reconception of autonomy in
feminist terms).
85. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies:
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419,
1468-69 (1991).
Jed Rubenfeld has offered a critique of the "personhood" version of pri-
vacy. See Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 754-61. Rubenfeld recognizes that pro-
ponents of a personhood approach to privacy advocate either a value-driven or
a value-neutral approach to the doctrine. Id. at 756. He rejects the value-
driven approach, which urges courts to protect those things that the commen-
tators, based on their values, believe are related to personhood. Such an ap-
proach, Rubenfeld warns, ultimately licenses judges to infuse the doctrine
with their own values; these may differ strongly from the commentator's own.
Id. For example, while a commentator may think that homosexual sex fosters
personhood and thus deserves protection, it seems highly unlikely that a ma-
jority of the current Supreme Court would agree. Id. Rubenfeld also rejects a
number of formulations of a value-neutral approach, on the ground that they
are incoherent. Id. at 756-82. It is unclear, however, if judges are any less
likely to infuse personal values into their decision making when the applicable
doctrine employs value-neutral terms. Compare Scott Altman, Beyond Can-
dor, 89 MIcH. L. REV. 296 (1990) (arguing that it is better to leave judges with
the impression that law is determinate because that will better constrain their
power) with MARK KELMAN, A GuIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 199-206
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The slogans chanted or held aloft on signs at any pro-
choice rally reflect the power that the concept of autonomy can
hold for women.8 6 Even if such appeals originally stemmed
from the law's treatment of abortion as a privacy/autonomy is-
sue, their continuing presence as a rallying cry indicates that
autonomy has some intrinsic force that attracts many women.
Hence, although it is important to recognize the risk that ap-
peals to autonomy can create (particularly if valuing autonomy
is seen as a reason to ignore or discard other more communitar-
ian values), the concept should not be discarded. Feminists
simply must be wary.
Moreover, a negative right of autonomy is not the only
value privacy can protect. Certain feminist scholars have ar-
ticulated visions of privacy that accord with feminist concerns
and values. For example, Dorothy Roberts offers a vision of a
"positive" right to privacy that would authorize the government
not simply to refrain from interfering with personhood, but
also to act when action is required to ensure personhood.8 7
This vision would take into account that, at least for poor wo-
men, "being left alone" may not guarantee dignity and
autonomy.8 8
Retaining some form of privacy doctrine, despite its risks,
(1987) (reiterating the critical legal studies argument that judging is inevitably
a political act). Thus, Rubenfeld may reject the value-driven approach to per-
sonhood too hastily.
Rubenfeld's rejection is especially troubling given the much more limited
nature of the approach he advocates. Rubenfeld urges courts to transform the
privacy inquiry into a consideration of whether the ramifications of a particu-
lar state action are so pervasive as to be totalitarian. Rubenfeld, supra note 81,
at 784-87. He posits that this approach will continue to protect some of the
same things that personhood theory protects, such as the right to abortion. Id
at 788-91. Rubenfeld concedes, however, that his approach is narrower than
personhood in some ways; for example, it would likely have no effect on state
laws prohibiting women from having children. Id& at 796-97. But cf. Roberts,
supra at 1472 (arguing that punishing drug-addicted mothers for the harm
done to their fetuses violates the right to privacy because "[d]enying someone
the right to bear children-or punishing her for exercising that right--de-
prives her of a basic part of her humanity"). Furthermore, Rubenfeld's theory
of privacy does not apply outside the framework of government action. By
definition, non-totalitarianism views privacy as solely concerned with state-
based coercion. In contrast, the personhood version of privacy could apply to
state tort schema, and thus could be used to combat private, as well as public,
privacy invasions.
86. Slogans that I have seen at rallies include: "Our bodies/our lives/our
right/to decide," "Keep your laws off my body," and "Not the church/not the
state/women must decide our fate."
87. Roberts, supra note 85, at 1479.
88. 1i at 1478.
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is also desirable because it can provide a more complete way for
women to express some injuries, such as the injury caused by
sexual harassment. As Catharine MacKinnon has discussed at
length, making sexual harassment actionable as a form of sex
discrimination names it as a harm to women as a group, as
something that happens to women "because they are women. '89
This is clearly important; it lets women know that they are not
isolated in their victimization and that the victimization is not
their fault.
The group harm, however, is not the only harm associated
with sexual harassment. Although sexual harassment hurts
women as a group because of their group membership, 90 it also
hurts individuals in ways deeply related to their personhood.
Women have described sexual harassment as depriving them of
their dignity or self-respect.9 1 A feminist vision of privacy
could center around such harms to women's personhood. By
using discrimination law and privacy law together, legal deci-
sion makers could more fully recognize the harm befalling vic-
tims of sexual harassment by recognizing both the group and
the individual aspects of that harm.
Finally, as a practical matter, the concept of privacy has
been useful in legal challenges to women's subordination. For
example, because of the historical narrowness of the remedy
provisions in federal antidiscrimination law,92 women have
sometimes utilized the tort of invasion of privacy in workplace
sexual harassment suits. Using the tort, state courts have
found sexual propositions and touching in the employment con-
text to be actionable because they intrude offensively into the
89. CATHARINE A. MAcKiNNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WO-
MEN xi (1979) [hereinafter MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT].
90. I& at 193-200.
91. "Like women who are raped, sexually harassed women feel humili-
ated, degraded, ashamed, embarrassed, and cheap, as well as angry." Idi at 47.
For anecdotal evidence about how women react to sexual harassment, see id-
at 47-55.
92. Courts have recognized sexual harassment of working women as a
form of sex discrimination actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 since the early 1970s. See id at 59-82 (describing the development of
sexual harassment law under Title VII). The remedies sexual harassment
plaintiffs may receive under Title VII, however, have been inadequate. Prior
to the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII plaintiffs could only
recover backpay and frontpay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). Thus, victims of
sexual harassment were unable to recover under Title VII for emotional or
physical harm resulting from the harassment. Although the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 allows some recovery for such harm, it caps damages at fairly moderate
levels. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981A (Supp. 1992).
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victim's private affairs. 93 On this ground, courts have awarded
full damages for all mental and physical injuries related to the
incidents. 94
Similarly, in UAW v. Johnson Controls,95 the Supreme
Court invoked notions of privacy as part of its justification for
holding that it is illegal under Title VII6 for employers to insti-
tute "fetal-protection" plans that ban fertile or pregnant wo-
men from potentially fetal-toxic workplaces.97 Appealing to
the ideal of equality underlying Title VII, the Court observed
that Johnson Controls's fetal protection plan discriminated on
its face.98 It further noted that under Title VII employers may
facially discriminate against women only if "'sex... is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation of that particular business or enterprise.' 99 The
Court found that Johnson Controls could not use this defense
because its exclusion of fertile women was not "occupa-
tional."'1  Relying specifically on the concept of privacy, the
Court asserted that decisions about how best to protect fetuses
are not the concern of employers; instead, "[d]ecisions about
the welfare of future children must be left to the parents who
conceive, bear, support, and raise them rather than to the em-
ployers who hire those parents."101
This echo of privacy rhetoric seems strange in a Title VII
opinion; Title VII on in its face concerns equality, not privacy.
Yet the Court's invocation of privacy norms likely did more for
women than would an appeal to equality alone. Indeed, relying
93. See Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Pease v.
Alford Photo Indus., 667 F. Supp. 1188, 1203 (W.D. Tenn. 1987); Rogers v.
Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523, 528 (D.D.C. 1981); Phillips v.
Smalley Maintenance Serv., 435 So. 2d 705, 708-11 (Ala. 1983).
94. See, e.g., Stockett, 791 F. Supp. at 1557-60; Pease, 667 F. Supp. at 1203;
Phillips, 435 So. 2d at 711-12.
95. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
96. Title VII, in relevant part, prohibits sex discrimination in the terms
and conditions of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1) (1988).
97. 111 S. Ct. at 1207. Several employees and their union challenged
Johnson Controls's policy of excluding fertile women from jobs involving ex-
posure to lead on the ground that lead could pose a hazard to a developing fe-
tus. The employees also challenged the company's failure to allow men to
transfer out of lead-hazardous jobs when they wanted to conceive children. Id.
at 1200.
98. Id at 1202-04.
99. Id at 1204 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988)) (emphasis added).
Courts and commentators refer to this exception as the bona fide occupational
qualification or "BFOQ" defense.




only on equality, a majority of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit sitting en banc held that Johnson Controls's
plan was legal, reasoning that men's and women's differing re-
productive roles justified the differential treatment.10 2 The
lower court decision illustrates the danger of using equality
doctrine in isolation: courts may justify disadvantages for wo-
men by resorting to "real differences." 10 3 By appealing to pri-
vacy and equality together, the Supreme Court avoided any
"difference" question and instead held that employers are
never allowed to treat a protected group less favorably than the
dominant group when the treatment's purpose is to interfere
with private matters.
Thus, a feminist conception of privacy seems not only pos-
sible, but desirable. Privacy doctrine theoretically can be used,
and practically has been used, to further values critically im-
portant to many women. Although the approach has risks, it is
difficult if not impossible to identify any legal doctrine that is
risk-free for women. Rather than discard potentially useful
doctrines, feminists must be cognizant of the risks.
2. Equality Doctrine is Not a Cure-All
Privacy critics criticize privacy and simultaneously offer
equality as the superior doctrinal basis for feminist claims. Yet
they cannot substantiate the proposition that equality provides
an easy (or at least easier) solution to the legal oppression of
women. Other feminist commentators have identified short-
comings in equality arguments that parallel those identified in
privacy doctrine. Additionally, in making their argument for a
doctrinal switch, feminists commonly rely on particular concep-
tions of equality-for example, equality as freedom from domi-
102. UAW v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871, 885 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc),
rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991). The Seventh Circuit's opinion quickly devolved
into a discussion of competing scientific studies purporting to demonstrate the
harm that lead poses to fetuses or to gametes. Id. at 875-83. The court as-
sumed that if fetal exposure to lead caused greater harm than spermatic expo-
sure to lead the company could justifiably exclude fertile women. Id. at 885.
Under this approach, bias in scientific research, which has tended to look for
explanations of birth defects in women's behavior rather than in men's, be-
comes a justification for discrimination in the workplace. See Lucinda M. Fin-
ley, The Exclusion of Fertile Women from the Hazardous Workplace: The
Latest Example of Discriminatory Protective Policies, or a Legitimate, Neutral
Response to an Emerging Social Problem?, in PRoc. OF N.Y.U. 38TH ANN.
NAT'L CONF. ON LAB., at 16-1, 16-6 (Richard Adelman ed., 1985).
103. For a thorough discussion of the problem of justifying disadvantageous
treatment of women through appeals to real biological differences, see Law,
supra note 23, at 987-1002.
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nance' 04-as the doctrine of promise. Courts have not widely
accepted these visions of equality, however, and there is no rea-
son to think that equality will prove easier to transform than
privacy.
Some privacy critics admit that privacy doctrine as cur-
rently constituted already contains an undercurrent of equality.
Giving force to the idea that abortion decisions should be pro-
tected as private is a belief that "abortion promises women sex
with men on the same reproductive terms as men have sex
with women."' 0 5 The right to abortion appeals to women be-
cause it promises women the freedom to explore and enjoy
their sexuality within the private sphere without fear of preg-
nancy, a freedom men have always had. 0 6 If the power imbal-
ance within the private sphere is ignored, then it does seem
that allowing women, rather than the government, to decide
whether to continue a pregnancy puts women on par with
men.
0 7
The same commentators criticize this promise of equality
as bankrupt because "under conditions of gender inequality,
sexual liberation in this sense does not free women; it frees
male sexual aggression."108 Accordingly, privacy doctrine fails
to empower women because embedded within it is a shallow
concept of equality, which does not take into account the distri-
bution of power in society. Indeed, the critics recognize that
courts have generally interpreted equality in this shallow man-
ner.10 9 In light of this critique, it is clear that simply shifting
104. For a full discussion of this concept, see infra text accompanying
notes 119-24. In contrast, Ruth Colker relies on a concept of equality that she
terms "equality as compassion." See Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and
Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011, 1027-
28 (1989).
105. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality, supra note 4, at 99.
106. See Olsen, supra note 29, at 110.
107. As one commentator put it, "[t]he Court's privacy analysis ... appeals
to women's desire for equality and for sexual freedom." Id. (emphasis added).
108. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality, supra note 4, at 99.
109. In an essay concerning discrimination, MacKinnon specifically ad-
dresses the narrow vision of equality that courts generally adopt. She notes
that "mainstream legal and moral theory" see inequality as a question of
"sameness and difference," rather than as a question of subordination or op-
pression. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance, supra note 73, at 32. The
perseverance of this shallow approach, which ignores the systematic subordi-
nation of women in society, explains why "sex equality law has been so utterly
ineffective at getting what we need and are socially prevented from having on
the basis of a condition of birth: a chance at productive lives of reasonable
physical security, self-expression, individuation, and minimal respect and dig-
nity." Id.
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from privacy to equality doctrine would not cure the ills that
the anti-privacy feminists identify. Instead, legal decision mak-
ers must recognize that women are oppressed and must con-
sciously grapple with the implications of that fact.'1 "
By attempting to rework equality while advocating the
abandonment of privacy, the anti-privacy theorists imply that
feminists can more easily transform equality doctrine than pri-
vacy doctrine. It is not clear whether they believe this is true
as a matter of logic or as a matter of political reality. In either
case, however, it is far from evident that they are correct. Be-
cause equality doctrine as presently constituted suffers defects
similar to privacy, it is an immense challenge to reform either
doctrine. In both cases the starting point is a non-transforma-
tive, male-oriented doctrine, hence it is difficult to claim that
one is inherently easier to salvage than the other.
Similarly, the internal logic of one doctrine is not clearly
superior to the other from a feminist standpoint. The Bowers
and Webster limitations on privacy doctrine do not reflect some
underlying necessity about the meaning of privacy. Indeed,
there is no logical reason why privacy doctrine cannot be trans-
formed to accommodate more feminist values.,1 '
Furthermore, logic alone does not control whether a doc-
trine can or will be transformed. It is not necessary to embrace
fully the teachings of the critical legal studies movement to re-
alize that law is not simply a matter of judges applying devel-
oped doctrines in a logical manner to new factual situations,
thus reaching the one true (inevitable, logically compelled, nat-
urally ordained) result. Thus, "[w]hether the Court overrules
Roe v. Wade and whether it unravels more of privacy doctrine
depends not upon any kind of abstract logic but upon political
policy choices." 1 2 After all, "[t]he content that the Supreme
Court gives to equality is a political question, not a kind of puz-
110. Indeed, although many feminist writers continue to see equality as a
promising doctrine, most urge that its promise will be fulfilled only if the doc-
trine is altered in some way. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 104, at 1027-28 (advo-
cating a model of "equality as compassion"); Law, supra note 23, at 1008-13
(arguing that equality doctrine must be transformed so that courts consider
discrimination on the basis of reproductive capacity an equal protection viola-
tion); Littleton, supra note 33, at 1312-36 (advocating a model of "equality as
acceptance"); MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 31 (elaborating an approach
to equality law based on preventing domination, rather than on treating like
people alike).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78 (discussing differing judicial
treatment of privacy).
112. Olsen, supra note 29, at 107.
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zle to be solved by some clever theorist."'1 3 Whether one doc-
trine will be easier politically to change than the other is a
difficult question. The current political climate can induce pes-
simism about our ability to progress under either doctrine. In
the privacy area, we have watched the Court chip away at the
right to abortion.114 It is unlikely, however, that conservative
political forces will be able to unravel much more, at least in
the short run."5
These same conservative political forces are at work in the
equality area, not only making it difficult to change the doc-
trine, but also requiring feminists to fight to maintain gains
won in the early 1970s." 6 The retreat from recognition of dis-
crimination as a group-based harm meriting group-based reme-
dies constitutes a step away from a world that accepts a
feminist vision of equality. The versions of equality most femi-
nist critics extol use equality doctrine to challenge the power
distribution among the sexes in our society." 7 In contrast, the
Court's current approach to equality considers individuals and
ignores questions of group subordination. Additionally, the
Court is more concerned with the perpetrator's perspective
(whether the discrimination was intentional) than with the vic-
tim's (whether there was a discriminatory effect).118
The same conservative politics threaten feminist gains in
113. Id. at 126.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16 (discussing recent Supreme
Court decisions on abortion).
115. For example, some commentators posit that Judge Robert Bork's
widely discussed belief that privacy doctrine might be invalid, and perhaps
should be undone, contributed significantly to his defeat in his bid to become a
Supreme Court Justice. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERIcAN JUDICIAL TRA-
DITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 427 (1988); Nina Totenberg,
The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1213, 1228 (1988). Similarly, when arguing that Webster was a
suitable case with which to overrule Roe v. Wade, the Reagan administration,
through Solicitor General Charles Fried, felt compelled to aver that "the gov-
ernment did not seek to unravel all of the right to privacy, but merely to pull
one thread." Olsen, supra note 29, at 106 (citing Transcript of Oral Arguments
Before Court on Abortion Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1989, at B12). The plain-
tiff's attorney responded "'It has been my personal experience that when I
pull a thread, my sleeve falls off.'" Id.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 17-22 (discussing the Supreme
Court's narrowing of equality doctrine).
117. For a fuller discussion of feminist approaches to equality doctrine, see
infra text accompanying notes 119-31.
118. See Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, in
THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 19, at 121, 123-26; cf. RHODE, supra note 23,
at 176-84 (faulting the Supreme Court's current approach to equal protection
from a feminist perspective because it focuses on discriminatory intent rather
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both privacy and equality. To transform either is an uphill
political battle. Hence, the privacy critics have not adequately
explained why we should switch to equality arguments rather
than attempt to transform privacy.
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE CRITIQUE OF EQUALITY
1. The Possibility of Redeeming Equality
The critics who urge equality's abandonment similarly can
be criticized for not exploring the possibility of transforming
the doctrine in a manner beneficial to women. Feminists have
identified several ways of reconceiving equality that move be-
yond the special treatment/equal treatment debate, without
wholly abandoning equality.
For example, MacKinnon advocates what she terms the
"dominance" approach to equality.119 Like the equality critics,
MacKinnon criticizes both the equal treatment and special
treatment camps of equality theory for using man "as the mea-
sure of all things."' 20 By asking decision makers to ignore gen-
der (that is, asking whether if this woman were a man she
would have gotten what she was denied), the equal treatment
version requires decision makers to systematically ignore the
oppression of women. Because of this, the equal treatment
strategy often has led to legal results that fail to challenge wo-
men's oppression.'2 1 The special treatment version of equality
is no better, however; it creates a "double standard" which nec-
essarily stigmatizes women and which provides an excuse for
continuing to exclude women from traditionally male pur-
suits.122 In light of this, MacKinnon urges that we stop asking
whether women receive formal equality or whether our differ-
ences from men merit special treatment. Instead, she advocates
that sex equality should be a "question of [gender] hierar-
than discriminatory effects); Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984
DuKE L.J. 447, 488-89 (same).
119. MacKinnon most fully develops the theory of treating equality as a
question of dominance rather than difference in her essay Difference and
Dominance, supra note 73. This theme has roots in her earlier work, see
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 89, at 106-27, and MacKinnon
explores it further in her later work. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TO-
WARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF T=E STATE 215-34 (1989); MacKinnon, Reflec-
tions, supra note 31, at 1293-94.
120. MAcKINNON, Difference and Dominance, supra note 73, at 34.
121. Id. at 34-38; see also supra text accompanying notes 46-47 (discussing
the criticism of equality doctrine).
122. Id. at 38.
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chy."'1 23 In asking the gender equality question, legal (or polit-
ical) decision makers should ask about the ways men dominate
women and should seek to redress that oppression.124
Similarly, Deborah Rhode advocates a shift to what she
terms the "disadvantage" approach to equality.125  Like
MacKinnon's dominance theory, Rhode's disadvantage theory
primarily concerns replacing formal equality with a commit-
ment to substantive equality that will improve women's lives.
Under Rhode's approach, legal decision makers do not automat-
ically accept the proposition that any difference between the
sexes justifies legal treatment that disadvantages women'126
Instead, they use gender distinctions as a basis for their deci-
sions only when the result will be to reduce gender disparities
in "political power, social status, and economic security."'' 7
At the core of Rhode's theory is an exhortation that the de-
cision maker be sensitive to the context of the problem being
addressed and to the complexity of women's interests12s
Rhode asserts that disadvantage theory is a better tool for wo-
men than MacKinnon's dominance theory because it invites the
decision maker to see women as a complex group whose inter-
ests may not be uniform129 Furthermore, Rhode's theory rec-
ognizes that in some contexts gender relationships are more
complex than simply the relationship of an oppressed class to
its oppressor.' 3
0
123. Id. at 41.
124. Id- at 40-44.
125. RHODE, supra note 23, at 82-86.
126. Id at 83.
127. Id.; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 617, 625-26 (1990). Rhode's approach seems to be a further development
of the "equality as acceptance" approach advanced by Christine Littleton. See
Littleton, supra note 33, at 1285. Littleton argues that "[t]he difference be-
tween human beings, whether perceived or real, and whether biologically or
socially based, should not be permitted to make a difference in the lived-out
equality of those persons." Id. at 1284-85.
128. RHODE, supra note 23, at 83.
129. Id at 83-84.
130. Id at 84. The "reasonable woman" standard for judging sexual har-
assment, which the Ninth Circuit recognized in Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872
(9th Cir. 1991), is arguably an example of the dominance and disadvantage ap-
proaches in action. In Ellison, the court held that, in sexual harassment cases
brought by women, it would judge whether the harrasser's conduct was so se-
vere or pervasive as to be illegal by asking whether the conduct would have
seemed severe or pervasive to a "reasonable woman." Id. at 879. The Court
reasoned that women and men often have different reactions to sexualized
conduct based in part on the fact that women "'have been raised in a society
where rape and sex-related violence have reached unprecedented levels, and a
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Either of these visions of equality answers much of the
anti-equality critique. Instead of simply requiring that women
be given the same entitlements as men to the extent that we
are like men, the dominance and disadvantage approaches spe-
cifically require the legal decision maker to ask whether or in
what ways women are oppressed or disadvantaged and to do
something about it. Rather than stigmatizing women by deriv-
ing entitlement to "special" things from women's differences
from men (and, thus, in some sense, suggesting women are less
competent or less fully human than men), the dominance and
disadvantage approaches derive women's entitlement from the
non-stigmatizing fact that historically society has oppressed or
disadvantaged women.131
Of course neither the dominance theory nor the disadvan-
tage theory can eliminate all possible risks that stem from the
use of an equality doctrine. Decision makers could point to
domination of women, or to their disadvantage, as an excuse for
vast pornography industry creates continuous images of sexual coercion, objec-
tification and violence."' Id at 879 n.9 (quoting Kathryn Abrams, Gender Dis-
crimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV.
1183, 1205 (1989)). The court rejected the traditional "reasonable person" stan-
dard because "[i]f we only examined whether a reasonable person would en-
gage in allegedly harassing conduct, we would run the risk of reinforcing the
prevailing level of discrimination. Harassers could continue to harass merely
because a particular discriminatory practice was common, and victims of har-
assment would have no remedy." Id at 878.
This approach seems to accord with both the dominance and disadvantage
models. The Ellison court looked at women's perceptions of sexualized con-
duct in the workplace. Based on this contextualized analysis, they recognized
that the prevalence of sex-related violence has dominated and disadvantaged
women in the past. Most importantly, they refused to allow the common
existence of sexual oppression to justify behavior in the workplace that causes
women further anguish.
131. These approaches also provide a means for challenging particular op-
pressions of women that are unredressable under the current scheme. For ex-
ample, equality doctrine as currently constituted has been ineffective as a tool
for raising pay in traditionally female occupations to equal that of traditionally
male jobs. See AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985) (revers-
ing district court and dismissing suit by union seeking pay equity for tradition-
ally female jobs). Under the traditional equality approach courts have found
no higher-paid men situated similarly enough to those occupying traditionally
female jobs to allow comparison. Under either the disadvantage or dominance
approaches, however, courts could institute comparable worth because contin-
ued substandard pay for women's work exacerbates women's domination or
disadvantage. See RHODE, supra note 23, at 190-200. This is not to suggest that
feminists must endorse only one version of equality. To the contrary, femi-
nists can use the concept of equality flexibly, to address particular situations.
See generally Majury, supra note 33, at 320-37 (applying several forms of
equality theory to maternity leave).
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continued paternalistic "protection" of women, thereby perpet-
uating the disadvantage. The risk of false paternalism seems
less likely, however, than under either of the traditional
schools of equality. Unlike their traditional counterparts, both
the dominance and disadvantage theories focus the decision
maker on the power imbalance between the sexes. This legal
focus would make it more difficult for a decision maker to fur-
ther the existing imbalance.
Another problem associated with both theories is the possi-
bility that our current judiciary will not recognize situations in
which women have been dominated and disadvantaged. The
risk that courts may subvert the theories, however, is no worse
than under the current, often ineffective use of equality doc-
trine.132 No legal approach to empowering the traditionally dis-
advantaged is wholly risk-free. The best we can do is to try to
minimize the risk.
2. The Problem with Abandoning Equality Doctrine
Despite the appeal of a non-traditional, responsibility ori-
ented approach to legal issues as a substitute for equality analy-
sis, there is a danger that such an approach ultimately will fail
because it does not conform to traditional modes of legal argu-
mentation or analysis. It is difficult to envision a court requir-
ing an employer to provide its employees with adequate
pregnancy leave because pregnancy is only a variation, not a
demeaning form, of human experience, or because the em-
ployer has a responsibility as part of a community to provide
such leave. As one commentator acknowledges, innovation is
difficult in the "litigation arena, where problems are crystal-
lized into disputes that then must be fit into the procrustean
bed of comfortable doctrinal frameworks such as equality anal-
ysis."'' 33 It may be similarly difficult for such arguments to per-
suade legislators. Thus, it seems that for now, this new
approach is better suited for use by legal scholars, who are con-
132. See Majury, supra note 33, at 330.
In an unequal society, equality will always be a double-edged instru-
ment: a tool which can be used to assist women in some circum-
stances, or some women, or a woman; but also a weapon which can be
used to restrict women, to punish them for failure to conform to the
male standard, or to take away women's "advantages."
133. Finley, supra note 4, at 1180. Finley concludes that currently it is a




cerned with expanding legal thinking, than for litigators or
lobbyists.134
An additional risk in replacing equality arguments with ar-
guments about nuances and responsibilities is that women's
claims could lose the moral high ground of civil rights claims
and appear to be simply the voice of one of many interest
groups.135 Equality has been seen, albeit erroneously, as a po-
litically neutral concept. 136 Hence, it was and is useful as a gen-
eral rallying cry. There is built-in moral appeal to such claims
as "equal pay for equal work."'1 37 In contrast, a direct demand
that those in power listen to the disempowered inevitably
seems political, because the claim is not grounded in any "neu-
tral principle," but instead is clearly directed at advocating the
interests of a particular social group. Losing this high ground is
a practical danger; it is questionable whether women have the
political muscle to flourish if we become just another interest
group.1
38
134. As Kenneth Karst explains:
the rhetoric of rights remains an indispensable element in the recon-
struction of the social order defining "woman's place." So long as the
courts know only the language of the ladder [i.e., the rhetoric of hier-
archies of rights], it would be foolish not to use that language in fram-
ing constitutional claims. Outside the courtroom, too, the language of
rights will be useful in bringing all sorts of claims, both personal and
political, to the forefront of men's consciousness.... To speak to men
in terms they understand, it will be necessary to begin by speaking
the language of a morality of rights.
Karst, supra note 118, at 471-72.
Similarly, Kimberl6 Crenshaw argues, "[p]eople can only demand change
in ways that reflect the logic of the institutions that they are challenging. De-
mands for change that do not reflect the institutional logic-that is, demands
that do not engage and subsequently reinforce the dominant ideology-will
probably be ineffective." Kimberl& W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrench-
ment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARv. L. REV. 1331, 1367 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
135. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Per-
spectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 599, 61048
(1986) (discussing how the assertion of rights has been and can be an effective
political strategy for women); cf PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS 146-65 (1991) (discussing the importance for blacks of con-
tinuing to assert their claims through the language of rights in order for their
claims to be effective); Crenshaw, supra note 134, at 1364-66 (1988) (same).
136. See Finley, supra note 4, at 1152 (explaining why this concept is
erroneous).
137. This moral appeal goes all the way back to Aristotle. See Cain, supra
note 54, at 818.
138. For example, consider the recent passage of statutes in Pennsylvania,
Louisiana, and Utah, which have significantly restricted the ability of women
to obtain abortions. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (West 1991), amended by
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The critics might respond once again that continuing to use
doctrines like privacy and equality, grounded as they are in the
liberal, male oriented conception of persons,13 9 will ultimately
fail to address women's needs. They might reason, as Robin
West has, that when theorists shoehorn feminist arguments
into this male-centric doctrine, the arguments can seem "irra-
tional" because approved doctrinal categories mask women's
claims rather than truly explaining how women have been
harmed or what they desire.140 This may make it easier for the
legal system to dismiss our claims. 141 These critics therefore
contend that we must fully abandon such liberal doctrines if
women are to progress.
Although this argument points out risks in continued use
of traditional doctrines, it fails to acknowledge that there may
be ways of minimizing the risks besides turning to the far-risk-
ier strategy of abandoning traditional doctrine entirely.142 If
we accept the assertion that, at least to some degree, women
tend to value connection more than autonomy, whereas men
tend toward the opposite, the less risky solution is to transform
doctrines like privacy and equality to reflect women's values.
We can push those doctrines in directions that will better ac-
cord with feminist values.1 43 Once the doctrines are shaped in
this way, feminist arguments made through them should no
longer seem "irrational." 144
1991 La. Acts 26; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3204 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302
(1992).
139. For a description of the liberal conception of human nature as essen-
tially atomistic, see West, supra note 54, at 4-7. But see McClain, supra note
84, at 1203-28 (disputing the claim that liberalism rests on an atomistic concep-
tion of human nature).
140. West, supra note 54, at 68-69; see also supra text accompanying notes
53-60 (discussing different voice and cultural feminism).
141. West, supra note 54, at 68-69. For example, an argument for abortion
in liberal terms, which analogizes the fetus to an invader from whom the wo-
man needs to defend herself, can seem illogical from a traditional liberal point
of view, which does not commonly view a fetus as an aggressor. Id- at 69.
142. As Deborah Rhode argues, "[w]hatever its inadequacies, rights rheto-
ric has been the vocabulary most effective in catalyzing mass progressive
movements in this culture .... Thus, critical feminism's central objective
should be not to delegitimate such frameworks but rather to recast their con-
tent and recognize their constraints." Rhode, supra note 127, at 635.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 80-88 for a discussion of privacy
and text accompanying notes 119-31 for a discussion of equality.
144. Cf. Karst, supra note 118, at 494 ("Raising our constitutional con-
sciousness of a morality of mutual responsibility and care need not supplant
the existing structure of constitutional rights, but can supplement it").
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C. CONCLUDING FROM THE CRITIQUES
The feminist critiques of privacy and equality make it clear
that continuing to use either doctrine is a risky venture. Femi-
nist scholars have not succeeded, however, in showing that one
doctrine is inherently riskier than the other. Furthermore,
they have not demonstrated a safe way to abandon the doc-
trines. At least in the short run, abandoning "rights" claims for
"responsibilities" claims is the riskiest course to take. Courts
(and perhaps legislators) will not listen to such claims. Stating
feminist goals in these terms risks societal rejection of our
goals as those of a political interest group. The result would be
the loss of the moral high ground that claims of rights provide
and the abandonment of important battles to brute political
force. To make any progress from within the system, it is nec-
essary to adopt in some way the language the system values,
while at the same time seeking to transform that language to
accommodate our values.
III. DISPUTING THE NEED FOR A SINGLE DOCTRINE
The praise for equality some of the privacy critics voice
seems driven by the idea that women would be better served by
a single legal doctrine with which to challenge all oppression.
This yearning is implicit, for example, in MacKinnon's related
critique of equality doctrine's narrowness.145 MacKinnon ar-
gues that equality doctrine as currently constituted fails "to ad-
dress sexual abuse and reproductive exploitation.' 146  Her
concern is that unless all subordinations are labeled as equality
deprivations, the legal establishment will ignore the fact that
particular types of subordination-such as sexual assault and
sexual harassment-happen to women "because they are wo-
men. ' 14 7 Thus, she argues, without a unified doctrine the full
extent of women's socially created and legally enforced subor-
dination will remain unrecognized. Similarly, Sylvia Law con-
tends that analyzing reproductive freedom issues as equality
questions will unify issues relating to subordination of women
in our society and emphasize that sexual subordination is a sin-
gle underlying problem that has many manifestations.
48
145. See MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 31, at 1298-1300.
146. Id- at 1299.
147. Id- at 1301 (discussing sexual abuse); see also MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT, supra note 89, at xi (discussing sexual harassment).
148. See Law, supra note 23, at 962-63 (urging a "unified approach to sex
equality" under which both laws that classify on the basis of sex and laws that
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The equality critics also implicitly endorse the notion that
feminists should adopt a unified approach to law, although for a
different reason. They suggest that by abandoning past ap-
proaches and adopting a rhetoric of nuances and responsibili-
ties, we could cleanly break with the past. Legal thinking
could escape the baggage of historical doctrines developed of,
by, and for men.1 49
Thus, underlying the feminist critiques of both privacy and
equality is the notion that feminists would be better off with a
unified approach with which to challenge women's subordina-
tion. Yet both groups of theorists overlook the risks a unified
approach presents and underestimate the advantages of using a
variety of approaches.
Those who seek out one best approach for all claims relat-
ing to women's empowerment sometimes ignore, or at least dis-
count, the fact that one type of argument may be more
appropriate and effective in particular fora, while other types of
arguments may appeal to other audiences. 5 0 An example is
the recent struggle for the adoption of family leave legisla-
tion.15 1 Those in Congress who supported the vetoed Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1991 in large part based their argu-
ments on the importance of leave policies in strengthening the
family and benefitting children. 5 2 Such pure policy argu-
govern reproduction can be analyzed). Similarly, Frances Olsen suggests that
framing the abortion question as an equality question might allow society "to
recognize antiabortion laws as part of the systematic oppression and devalua-
tion of women." Olsen, supra note 29, at 117.
149. See Finley, supra note 4, at 1165-67, 1179-80.
150. See Abrams, supra note 32, at 800 ("I... suggest that feminists and
other legal scholars have at our disposal a wider array of tools for expressing
our situation and persuading each other than we sometimes suspect; and that
we may come to useful insights about using them by considering their effects
on our audience .. ").
151. President Clinton signed the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(P.L. 103-3) into law on February 5, 1993. Clinton Signs Family Leave Bill
Into Law, Proclaims End of Gridlock, Daily Executive Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at
D-32 (Feb. 8, 1993). President Bush had twice vetoed the measure. Id
152. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 68, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1991) (" 'Parental
leave is critical to the healthy development of children and families.'") (quot-
ing Dr. Edward Zigler, Director of the Yale Bush Center on Child Develop-
ment and Social Policy); H.R. REP. No. 135, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 2
(1991) ("(2) it is important to the development of the child and to the family
unit that fathers and mothers be able to participate in early childrearing and
the care of their family members who have serious health conditions; (3) the
lack of employment opportunities to accommodate working parents can force
individuals to choose between job security and parenting."); H.R. REP. No. 135,
102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 8 (1991) (" 'For over thirty years, it has been well
known that children who are hospitalized get well faster and have fewer com-
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ments, however, would not sustain leave statutes if challenged
in court. When California's maternity leave law was chal-
lenged on the basis that it was formally unequal, the Supreme
Court upheld it not because of the importance of leave in
strengthening the family unit, but because of the importance of
leave in allowing women to have an equal chance at competing
in the workplace.153
Furthermore, the complexity of women's problems mili-
tates in favor of maintaining a variety of doctrinal approaches.
As addressed previously, using equality and privacy doctrine to-
gether allows women to challenge sexual harassment as some-
thing that happens to women because they are women as well
as something that deeply hurts women's individual sense of dig-
nity and personhood.1s4 Similarly, equality and privacy used to-
gether can achieve the empowering result of abolishing fetal
protection plans.155 Such a multifaceted approach can give wo-
men greater ability to articulate the harms they have suffered
and give the legal system greater understanding of the complex
problems that women face.15 6
Finally, the advocates of a unified doctrine tend to treat
women as a monolithic group and ignore real variety among us.
Several women of color have argued that appeals to equality
and privacy are deeply important to them, even if they can be
threatening to other women.15 7
plications when their parents are able to be with them.' ") (quoting Dr. Je-
rome A. Paulson of the American Academy of Pediatrics).
153. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
Privacy theorists might argue this example demonstrates feminists would be
better off abandoning equality arguments, since, without Title VII's equality
mandate, there would have been no basis to challenge the California law.
Even if feminists do abandon equality doctrine as a preferred basis for legal
argumentation, however, others are likely to continue using it. For this reason
alone it is important to develop a feminist version of equality doctrine; aban-
doning equality risks having courts apply the doctrine without feminist input.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
155. See sup'ra text accompanying notes 95-103.
156. This point is analogous to Kathryn Abrams's argument that we should
resist describing women's choices as determined primarily or entirely by male-
centric ideological influence and instead acknowledge that many factors bear
on women's decisionmaking; ideological determination is only one part. See
Abrams, supra note 32, at 796-97.
157. See WILLIAMS, supra note 135, at 146-65; Crenshaw, supra note 134, at
1357-58; Roberts, supra note 85, at 1480-81 & n.305.
To the extent that it is a social construct, equality can be decon-
structed and, at least theoretically, reconstructed as a means of chal-
lenging, rather than legitimating, social institutions created from the
phallocentric perspective.... [R]econstruction is crucial for less pow-




Feminist critics rightly point out dangers associated with
privacy and equality as currently constituted. Indeed, it should
not be surprising that using doctrines adopted by the powerful
and defined by their interests is risky for those seeking to re-
distribute power. The critics are not persuasive, however,
when they suggest that we can easily address these dangers by
either altering the doctrinal basis of our arguments from pri-
vacy to equality or by entirely abandoning these traditional
doctrines in favor of appeals to responsibilities and interconnec-
tion. There are equal or perhaps greater risks associated with
committing to any one approach as the last, best hope for wo-
men. It is too soon, however, to discard the privacy and equal-
ity doctrines as hopelessly beyond redemption. Instead,
working with a realization of the risks inherent in the doc-
trines, feminists may be able to transform them in ways that
will empower women.
abandon hard-won rights for the ephemeral promise of direct political
struggle.
Littleton, supra note 33, at 1283 & n.24; see also Rhode, supra note 127, at 634-
35 (discussing the feminist defense of rights); cf ELIZABETH V. SPELmAN, INES-
sENTIAL WOMAN (1988) (discussing the tendency of feminist theory to ignore
the viewpoint of all but white, middle class, heterosexual, Christian women);
Cain, supra note 54, at 838-39 (discussing the argument of "postmodern" femi-
nists that "It]here is no single theory of equality that will work for the benefit
of all women").
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